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The past is never dead. It’s not even past.
Faulkner (1950/2011, p. 73)
More than 20 years ago, Crews (1995) coined the term 
“memory wars” to refer to a contentious debate regard-
ing the existence of repressed memories, which refers 
to memories that become inaccessible for conscious 
inspection because of an active process known as 
repression. This debate raged throughout the 1990s and 
was widely assumed to have subsided in the new mil-
lennium. A number of prominent authors who were 
skeptical of repressed memories (e.g., Barden, 2016; 
McHugh, 2003; Paris, 2012) declared the memory wars 
to be effectively over, essentially arguing that most 
researchers and clinicians now understand that believ-
ing in such memories without reservation is at best 
questionable scientifically. The argument among these 
authors is essentially that the recovered-memory skep-
tics won. Others argue that the memory wars have been 
resolved in the opposite direction, stating that there is 
now better evidence for a trauma-dissociation model 
and less room for a skeptical stance toward repressed 
(dissociated; see below) memories (Dalenberg et  al., 
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Abstract
Can purely psychological trauma lead to a complete blockage of autobiographical memories? This long-standing 
question about the existence of repressed memories has been at the heart of one of the most heated debates in modern 
psychology. These so-called memory wars originated in the 1990s, and many scholars have assumed that they are over. 
We demonstrate that this assumption is incorrect and that the controversial issue of repressed memories is alive and 
well and may even be on the rise. We review converging research and data from legal cases indicating that the topic 
of repressed memories remains active in clinical, legal, and academic settings. We show that the belief in repressed 
memories occurs on a nontrivial scale (58%) and appears to have increased among clinical psychologists since the 
1990s. We also demonstrate that the scientifically controversial concept of dissociative amnesia, which we argue is a 
substitute term for memory repression, has gained in popularity. Finally, we review work on the adverse side effects 
of certain psychotherapeutic techniques, some of which may be linked to the recovery of repressed memories. The 
memory wars have not vanished. They have continued to endure and contribute to potentially damaging consequences 
in clinical, legal, and academic contexts.
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2012). Some proponents of the idea of dissociative 
amnesia (i.e., the inability to remember autobiographic 
experiences usually as a result of trauma) have even 
likened skeptics to climate-science deniers (Brand et al., 
2018, in response to Merckelbach & Patihis, 2018). Their 
argument appears to be that they have won the memory 
wars, and further proof of this is the continued inclusion 
of dissociative amnesia in the fifth edition of the Diag-
nostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM–
5; American Psychiatric Association, 2013; see also 
Spiegel et al., 2011).
In this article, we present evidence that the debate 
concerning repressed memories is by no means dead. 
To the contrary, we contend that it rages on today and 
that the term dissociative amnesia is being used as a 
substitute term for repressed memory. To buttress this 
point, we present converging lines of evidence from 
several sources suggesting that the concept of repressed 
memories has not vanished and that it has merely reap-
peared in numerous guises (e.g., in the context of dis-
sociative amnesia). Admittedly, some researchers have 
argued that the memory wars have persisted (e.g., 
Patihis, Ho, Tingen, Lilienfeld, & Loftus, 2014), but no 
review has systematically and critically evaluated this 
proposition. In this article, we amass evidence from 
multiple sources showing that beliefs associated with 
repressed memories and related topics such as dissocia-
tive amnesia, far from being extinguished, as claimed 
by some scholars, remain very much alive today. Fur-
thermore, we demonstrate that these beliefs carry sig-
nificant risks in clinical and legal settings.
Repressed Memories and the  
Memory Wars
As Ellenberger (1970) explained in his classic mono-
graph, the concept of repressed memories traces its 
roots to the psychoanalytic theory and practice of Sig-
mund Freud, who in turn was influenced by physician-
hypnotists, such as Jean-Martin Charcot, in the final 
decades of the 19th century. At the heart of this concept 
is the idea that traumatic experiences are often so over-
whelming that people use defense mechanisms to cope 
with them. One of these mechanisms involves the auto-
matic and unconscious repression of the traumatic 
memory with the consequence that people no longer 
recollect or retain awareness of the experience that 
triggered it (e.g., Loftus, 1993; McNally, 2005; Piper, 
Lillevik, & Kritzer, 2008). Nevertheless, according to this 
view, the repressed trauma ostensibly exacts a serious 
mental and physical toll (Hornstein, 1992), manifesting 
itself psychologically and somatically in a wide array 
of symptoms (e.g., fainting, amnesia, mutism). This 
influential body-keeps-the-score hypothesis implies that 
trauma can be “entirely organized on an implicit or per-
ceptual level, without an accompanying narrative about 
what happened” (van der Kolk & Fisler, 1995, p. 512). 
The goal of therapy is thus to make the implicit—the 
repressed—explicit (Yapko, 1994a), following Freud’s 
famous tenet that psychoanalysis aims to make the 
unconscious conscious. Thus, the notion of repressed 
memories encompasses three ideas: People repress trau-
matic experiences, the repressed content has psycho-
pathological potential, and recovering traumatic content 
is necessary for engendering symptom relief.
In the 1990s, as we demonstrate in a review of data 
of surveyed clinicians, the belief in repressed memories 
was endemic in therapeutic circles. Even when patients 
did not recollect the trauma, such as sexual abuse, some 
therapists suggested that their unconscious may harbor 
repressed memories. When clients presented with 
symptoms of, for example, anxiety, mood, personality, 
or eating disorders, many clinicians seemed to take 
these symptoms as signs of long-repressed memories 
of abuse. Furthermore, in the 1990s, dream interpreta-
tion, hypnosis, guided imagery, repeated cuing of mem-
ories, and diary methods, among other recovered-memory 
techniques, were used by many practitioners to osten-
sibly uncover repressed memories and bring them to 
the surface of consciousness. As a result of these treat-
ments, patients started to recover purported memories 
of abuse, typically sexual abuse, and some filed crimi-
nal or civil suits against their alleged perpetrator (Loftus, 
1994; Loftus & Ketcham, 1994).
During these therapeutic interventions, suggestive 
techniques were commonly used to recover the alleged 
repressed memory. At that time, laboratory research 
began to show the deleterious effects of suggestion on 
autobiographical recollections of childhood episodes. 
In one of the first such studies, Loftus and Pickrell 
(1995) asked students to report on four events that 
happened in their childhood. One event was fabricated 
and involved being lost in a shopping mall at about 
5 years old. Students were told that their parents pro-
vided these narratives to the experimenters, while in 
fact, parents had confirmed that the event did not hap-
pen. After three suggestive interviews, 25% (n = 6) of 
the participants claimed that the false event in fact had 
occurred. This and other studies during the 1990s indi-
cated that false autobiographical memories1 can be 
implanted with suggestive interviewing techniques 
(e.g., Hyman, Husband, & Billings, 1995; for earlier 
relevant work, see Laurence & Perry, 1983; for a review 
of false memories before 1980, see Patihis & Younes 
Burton, 2015).
Many memory scholars have argued on the basis of 
this research that repressed memories recovered in 
therapy may not be based on true events but could be 
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false memories (Lindsay & Read, 1995; Loftus & Davis, 
2006). An additional scenario offered by researchers is 
that some people may reinterpret childhood events as 
a result of therapy and come to experience this rein-
terpretation as a recovered memory of abuse (McNally, 
2012). For example, Schooler (2001) argued that indi-
viduals may initially not experience their abuse as trau-
matic but later come to reevaluate it in this fashion. 
This change in meta-awareness may be experienced as 
a recovery of a memory when it instead comprises a 
new interpretation of a memory that was accessible all 
along. Schooler offered several case descriptions sug-
gestive of this intriguing process, but strictly speaking 
it does not involve the reemergence of repressed mem-
ories into consciousness. Nevertheless, the reinterpreta-
tion account may be a plausible explanation of certain 
recovered memories of events that were genuinely 
experienced.
Still, not all cases that were described by Schooler 
(2001) can be interpreted in terms of reevaluation. 
Wagenaar and Crombag (2005), for example, noted the 
inherent problems that such descriptions have to dem-
onstrate the existence of recovered memories. They 
criticized Schooler’s case descriptions on the grounds 
that many assumptions needed to be met to confirm 
the existence of recovered memories in these cases. For 
example, Wagenaar and Crombag observed that alleged 
victims sometimes received therapy that may have influ-
enced their memories. In addition, Wagenaar and Crom-
bag noted that claiming to have forgotten sexual abuse 
is not the same as having forgotten the abuse.
Apart from suggestive techniques that might lead to 
the creation of memory aberrations, some memory 
researchers noted that the concept of repressed memo-
ries is difficult to reconcile with studies on the effects 
of trauma on memory. Specifically, a large body of data 
suggests that the central aspects of trauma tend to be 
relatively well remembered (McNally, 2005). Several 
authors concluded that complete memory loss for trau-
matic events is rare among trauma victims, such as 
Holocaust survivors (Wagenaar & Groeneweg, 1990), 
survivors of Japanese/Indonesian concentration camps 
(Merckelbach, Dekkers, Wessel, & Roefs, 2003), and 
victims of sexual abuse (Goodman et al., 2003). Fur-
thermore, the idea of repressed memories runs counter 
to well-established principles of human memory. For 
example, purported repressed memories are often 
about repeated experiences of abuse, but repeated 
events are generally well recollected. In addition, peo-
ple with posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) frequently 
experience flashbacks and intrusive memories of the 
trauma and hence do not typically report repressed 
memories, at least of their triggering traumatic event. 
In addition, the idea of apparent recovered memories 
suggests that experiences can be forgotten and “recov-
ered” following retrieval cues. This common memory 
phenomenon does not require the idea of repressed 
memories (for an overview, see Roediger & Bergman, 
1998).
The recovery of mundane childhood memories is a 
perfectly normal phenomenon, although people may 
find it difficult to estimate how long they have not 
thought about a childhood experience (Parks, 1999). 
The recovery of a purportedly long-forgotten trauma is 
less plausible in light of everything that we know about 
traumatic memories (see above), and in such cases the 
question is whether there is independent evidence to 
corroborate the memory. Thus, a central issue concern-
ing recovered memories is whether they can be inde-
pendently corroborated. Studies examining corroborative 
evidence of recovered memories are often limited 
because they rely exclusively on victims’ characteriza-
tions of corroboration (e.g., Chu, Frey, Ganzel, & 
Matthews, 1999; Herman & Harvey, 1997). Research in 
which at least partial independent corroboration has 
been sought demonstrated that continuous memories 
of child sexual abuse recalled outside of therapy were 
more often corroborated than discontinued memories 
of abuse recovered in therapy (Geraerts et  al., 2007; 
see also McNally, Perlman, Ristuccia, & Clancy, 2006). 
Another key point concerning recovered memories is 
that people may not think about the abuse for many 
years or may forget their previous recollections of their 
traumatic experience. Such people might then sponta-
neously recover memories of abuse when reminded 
about the abuse outside of therapy. However, such a 
phenomenon, psychologically important as it is, is a far 
cry from repressing a richly detailed memory in its 
entirety and later recalling it in therapy or everyday life 
(McNally & Geraerts, 2009).
One way to examine how clinicians think about the 
reality of repressed memories is to survey them about their 
beliefs on the topic and on their technical knowledge of 
how memory works. In this respect, a summary of 
practitioner-survey studies since the 1990s is informative.
Memory Beliefs About Repressed 
Memories: From Then to Now
Beliefs among clinical psychologists
Scientific interest in what therapists and other mental-
health professionals know about the functioning of 
memory originated because incorrect beliefs about 
memory could catalyze suggestive clinical practices and 
flawed treatment plans (Gore-Felton et al., 2000). Yapko 
(1994a, 1994b) conducted one of the first surveys of 
memory beliefs of psychology professionals. He found 
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that 34% (n = 190) of master’s-level psychotherapists 
and 23% (n = 48) of PhD psychotherapists agreed that 
traumatic memories uncovered via hypnosis are authen-
tic. Moreover, 59% (n = 513) of clinicians agreed that 
“events that we know occurred but can’t remember are 
repressed memories” (Yapko, 1994a, p. 231). Yapko 
(1994a) also found that 49% (n = 419) agreed that “mem-
ory is a reliable mechanism when the self-defensive 
need for repression is lifted” (p. 232). Dammeyer, 
Nightingale, and McCoy (1997) found that 58% (n = 64) 
of PhD-level clinicians, 71% (n = 74) of PsyD-level clini-
cians, and 60% (n = 43) of MSW-level clinicians agreed 
that repressed memories are genuine. Merckelbach and 
Wessel (1998) detected an even higher percentage: 96% 
(n = 25) of licensed psychotherapists endorsed the view 
that repressed memories exist. Poole, Lindsay, Memon, 
and Bull (1995; Survey 2) found that 71% (n = 37) of 
clinical psychologists reported that they had encoun-
tered at least one case of a recovered memory (see also 
Polusny & Follette, 1996).
These studies were performed in the 1990s, which 
is considered to be the zenith of interest in repressed 
memories. After that period, a wealth of research pub-
lished in psychological, psychiatric, and more legally 
oriented journals concluded that the notion of repressed 
memories is a highly problematic concept, particularly 
in the courts (Loftus, 2003; McNally, 2005; Piper et al., 
2008; Porter, Campbell, Birt, & Woodworth, 2003; Rofé, 
2008; Takarangi, Polaschek, Hignett, & Garry, 2008). 
Despite these critical articles, many psychologists, espe-
cially clinical and counseling psychologists, continue 
to harbor the idea that traumatic memories can be bur-
ied for years or decades in the unconscious and later 
recovered. Magnussen and Melinder (2012) surveyed 
licensed psychologists and found that 63% (n = 540) 
believed recovered memories to be “real.” Kemp, 
Spilling, Hughes, and de Pauw (2013) demonstrated 
that 89% (n = 333) of surveyed clinical psychologists 
believed that memories for childhood trauma (such as 
sexual abuse) can be “blocked out” for many years. 
Patihis et al. (2014) found that 60.3% (n = 35) of clinical 
practitioners and 69.1% (n = 56) of psychoanalysts 
agreed that traumatic memories are often repressed. 
Kagee and Breet (2015) found that 75.7% (n = 78) of 
103 South African psychologists responded probably 
or definitely true to the statement that “individuals com-
monly repress the memories of traumatic experiences” 
(Kagee & Breet, 2015, p. 5).
Ost, Easton, Hope, French, and Wright (2017) showed 
that 69.6% (n = 87) of clinical psychologists strongly 
endorsed the belief that “the mind is capable of uncon-
sciously ‘blocking out’ memories of traumatic events” 
(p. 60). Wessel (2018) recently examined memory 
beliefs among eye-movement desensitization and repro-
cessing (EMDR) practitioners. EMDR is thought to be 
effective in making traumatic memories less vivid and 
emotionally negative (Lee & Cuijpers, 2013). Wessel 
asked EMDR practitioners whether access to traumatic 
memories can be blocked and found that 93% (n = 457) 
responded affirmatively.
Beliefs among other professionals
Researchers have surveyed other professionals for 
whom it would be important to possess accurate knowl-
edge concerning memory. Many of these studies did 
not specifically ask about professionals’ beliefs con-
cerning the existence of repressed memories but instead 
asked about issues related to eyewitness memory (e.g., 
confidence-accuracy relationship; see Magnussen, 
Melinder, Stridbeck, & Raja, 2010). Exceptions to this 
trend include the study by Benton, Ross, Bradshaw, 
Thomas, and Bradshaw (2006). In an American sample, 
they demonstrated that 73% (n = 81) of jurors, 50% 
(n = 21) of judges, and 65% (n = 34) of law-enforcement 
personnel believed in long-term repressed memories. 
Odinot, Boon, and Wolters (2015) asked Dutch police 
interviewers about whether traumatic memories can be 
repressed. They found that 75.7% (n = 108) agreed that 
they could. In a recent study, 84% (n = 133) of Dutch 
child-protection workers indicated that traumatic mem-
ories are often repressed (Erens, Otgaar, Patihis, & De 
Ruiter, 2019).
Beliefs among laypersons
Laypeople such as undergraduates have also been asked 
in a number of studies to indicate their levels of belief 
concerning the existence of repressed memories (Lynn, 
Evans, Laurence, & Lilienfeld, 2015). Golding, Sanchez, 
and Sego (1996) reported that (a) 89% of 613 under-
graduates were familiar with a circumstance in which 
someone recovered a repressed memory, (b) 75% of 
these students noted that the source of this information 
was television, and (c) belief in repressed memories was 
positively correlated with the amount of media expo-
sure. Merckelbach and Wessel (1998) found that 94% 
(n = 47) of students endorsed the idea that repressed 
memories exist. Magnussen et al. (2006) surveyed 2000 
Norwegian people from the general public. They found 
that 45% (n = 900) of respondents believed that trau-
matic memories can be repressed. Strikingly, 40% (n = 
800) believed that people who committed a murder can 
repress the memory of that event. Finally, Patihis et al. 
(2014) found that 81% (n = 316) of undergraduates 
believed that traumatic memories are often repressed.
On the basis of these survey data, we calculated the 
overall percentage of people who believe in the exis-
tence of repressed memories in the combined samples 
(see Table 1). Although caution needs to be exercised 
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Table 1. Percentages of People Who Believe in the Concept of Repressed Memory Among Various Studies
Study N % Statement Scale Country
Clinical psychologists  
Yapko (1994a) 869 59 “Events that we know 
occurred but can’t 
remember are repressed 
memories.”
Agree–disagree U.S.
Dammeyer, 
Nightingale, and 
McCoy (1997)
111 58a “Do you believe that repressed 
memory exists?”
1 = definitely no, 10 = 
definitely yes
U.S.
Dammeyer et al. 
(1997)
105 71 “Do you believe that repressed 
memory exists?”
1 = definitely no, 10 = 
definitely yes
U.S.
Dammeyer et al. 
(1997)
75 60 “Do you believe that repressed 
memory exists?”
1 = definitely no, 10 = 
definitely yes
U.S.
Merckelbach and 
Wessel (1998)
27 96 “[Does] repression exist?” Yes, no, don’t know The Netherlands
Magnussen and 
Melinder (2012)
858 63 “Sometimes adults in 
psychotherapy remember 
traumatic events from early 
childhood, about which they 
previously had absolutely 
no recollection. Do you 
think such memories are 
real or false?”
All are real, most are 
real, most are false, 
all are false-uncertain
Norway
Kemp et al. (2013) 375 89 “Can memories for childhood 
trauma (i.e., sexual abuse) 
be ‘blocked out’ from 
conscious memory for many 
years?”
Yes, but rare; don’t 
know; no, don’t 
believe this
England and 
Wales
Patihis et al. (2014) 58 60.3b “Traumatic memories are often 
repressed.”
Strongly disagree, 
disagree, slightly 
disagree, slightly 
agree, agree, strongly 
agree
U.S.
Patihis et al. (2014) 82 69.1 “Traumatic memories are often 
repressed.”
Strongly disagree, 
disagree, slightly 
disagree, slightly 
agree, agree, strongly 
agree
U.S.
Kagee and Breet 
(2015)
103 75.7 “Individuals commonly repress 
the memories of traumatic 
experiences.”
Definitely untrue, 
probably untrue, 
probably true, 
definitely true
South Africa
Ost et al. (2017) 125 69.6 “The mind is capable of 
unconsciously ‘blocking 
out’ memories of traumatic 
events.”
1 = strongly disagree;  
4 = strongly agree
U.K.
Wessel (2018) 492 93 “It is possible that access 
to trauma memory is 
blocked.”c
Agree, disagree, no 
opinion
The Netherlands
Other professionals  
Benton Ross, 
Bradshaw, 
Thomas, and 
Bradshaw (2006)
111 73 “Traumatic experiences can 
be repressed for many years 
for many years and then 
recovered.”
Generally true, generally 
false, I don’t know
U.S.
(continued)
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Study N % Statement Scale Country
Benton et al. 
(2006)
42 50 “Traumatic experiences can 
be repressed for many years 
and then recovered.”
Generally true, generally 
false, I don’t know
U.S.
Benton et al. 
(2006)
52 65 “Traumatic experiences can 
be repressed for many years 
and then recovered.”
Generally true, generally 
false, I don’t know
U.S.
Odinot, Boon, and 
Wolters (2015)
143 75.7 “Traumatic experiences can 
be repressed for many years 
and then recovered.”d
Agree, disagree The Netherlands
Erens Otgaar, 
Patihis, and De 
Ruiter (2019)
158 84 “Traumatic memories are often 
repressed because of their 
painful content.”
Agree, disagree The Netherlands
Laypersons  
Merckelbach and 
Wessel (1998)
50 94 “[Does] repression exist?” Yes, no, don’t know The Netherlands
Magnussen et al. 
(2006)
2,000 45 “Sometimes adults in 
psychotherapy remember 
traumatic events from early 
childhood, about which they 
previously had absolutely 
no recollection. Do you 
think such memories are 
real or false?”
All are real, most are 
real, most are false, 
all are false-uncertain
Norway
Magnussen et al. 
(2006)
2,000 40 “Sometimes adults in 
psychotherapy remember 
traumatic events from early 
childhood, about which they 
previously had absolutely 
no recollection. Do you 
think such memories are 
real or false?”
All are real, most are 
real, most are false, 
all are false-uncertain
Norway
Patihis et al. (2014) 390 81 “Traumatic memories are often 
repressed.”
Strongly disagree, 
disagree, slightly 
disagree, slightly 
agree, agree, strongly 
agree
U.S.
Note: U.S. = United States; U.K. = United Kingdom.
aRefers to people scoring 8, 9, or 10. bRefers to people who chose slightly agree, agree, or strongly agree. cTranslated from the Dutch: “goed 
mogelijk dat toegang tot traumaherinnering is geblokkeerd.” dTranslated from the Dutch: “Traumatische ervaringen kunnen jarenlang worden 
verdrongen (d.w.z. geheel vergeten zijn) en dan toch nog worden hervonden.
Table 1. (Continued)
when collapsing data across such surveys because the 
samples may vary on many dimensions, aggregated 
data can be informative given they can generally be 
expected to cancel out largely random differences in 
participant characteristics. On average, 58% (n = 4,745) 
of those who were surveyed indicated some degree of 
belief in the existence of repressed memories. When 
we examined the prevalence of these beliefs across 
subgroups within the combined sample, interesting 
results emerged. Among clinical psychologists, 70% 
(n = 2,305) believed in the existence of repressed mem-
ories. This percentage was somewhat lower in the 1990s 
(61%; n = 719) and increased to 76% (n = 1,586) from 
2010 onward. Furthermore, 75% (n = 377) of other 
professionals expressed a strong belief in repressed 
memories, as did 46% (n = 2,063) of laypersons.
We also performed additional analyses. For example, 
when we focused only on survey items using the word 
“repression,” we found a prevalence of 65% (n = 1,265) 
in the belief of repressed memories. In addition, 
because the items used differed to some extent among 
survey studies, we concentrated on statements for 
which people were asked specifically about the fre-
quency of repressed memories (e.g., “Traumatic 
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memories are often repressed”). When we focused on 
these statements (Erens et  al., 2019; Kagee & Breet, 
2015; Patihis et al., 2014), we found that 78% (n = 618) 
of surveyed people believed that traumatic experiences 
are often repressed. We also compared the rates of 
belief in repressed memories in the 1990s with those 
of all studies performed after the 1990s. A prevalence 
of 62% (n = 766) was observed for studies in the 1990s; 
this rate was slightly lower for studies performed after 
the 1990s (57%; n = 3,979).
Taken together, our data suggest, perhaps surpris-
ingly, that mental-health professionals in our combined 
samples were not more critical about repressed memo-
ries than were laypeople. This finding underscores our 
argument that a belief in repressed memories is deeply 
rooted in modern Western societies. Moreover, the data 
suggest that despite a plethora of scientific work calling 
the existence of repressed memories into question (e.g., 
Loftus & Davis, 2006), clinical psychologists’, other 
mental-health professionals’, and the general public’s 
views on repressed memories remain strong. Further-
more, it seems that belief in repressed memories even 
increased within clinical psychologists.
Still, in certain groups of professionals, notably those 
working in legal psychology, skepticism regarding 
repressed memories is high. For example, Kassin, Tubb, 
Hosch, and Memon (2001) found that 22% of experts 
opined that repressed memories are “reliable enough” 
to present as evidence in the courtroom. Likewise, some 
recent research suggests that memory scientists tend to 
harbor strong reservations concerning the existence of 
repressed memories (only 12.5% agreed that repressed 
memories can be retrieved in therapy accurately; 27.2% 
of experimental psychologists agreed to some extent that 
traumatic memories are often repressed; Patihis, Ho, 
Loftus, & Herrera, 2018). It is important to emphasize 
that many informed scientists are skeptical: It counters 
the argument that repressed memories must exist because 
so many people believe in them, a tempting logical error 
termed the bandwagon fallacy (Briggs, 2014).
Many of these surveys relied on the terms repression 
or repressed memories. These terms may have all kinds 
of connotations, leading to artificially raised endorse-
ment patterns suggestive of belief in repressed memo-
ries. Brewin, Li, Ntarantana, Unsworth, and McNeilis 
(2019; Study 3) recently argued that high endorsement 
rates in the belief in repressed memories (to the state-
ment “Traumatic experiences can be repressed for many 
years and then recovered”) actually reflect a belief in 
conscious memory suppression (see section below on 
retrieval inhibition). They found that when members of 
the general public were asked about their belief in 
conscious repression and were questioned regarding 
repressed memories (“Traumatic experiences can be 
repressed for many years and then recovered”), similar 
endorsement rates were found. However, because 
Brewin and colleagues did not include a survey item 
on unconscious repression, it is unknown which 
endorsement rates would be detected for such a con-
troversial statement. To remedy this omission, Otgaar 
et al. (2019) specifically inquired about people’s belief 
in unconscious repression. They found high endorse-
ment rates for belief in both conscious and unconscious 
repression (around 60%), implying that the belief in 
repressed memories is still widespread. In what follows, 
we show that, as is true for the belief in repressed 
memories, dissociative amnesia, a conceptual twin of 
repression, has been deeply embedded into psychology 
lore in such a way that it could be the most potent 
threat to extending the memory wars.
Dissociative Amnesia = Repressed 
Memories?
Despite the widespread belief in repressed memory, 
the term “repression” became controversial in the mem-
ory wars and is now seldom used in a credible context 
in scientific publications. After the concept became 
intensely controversial, many clinicians adopted a new 
and perhaps more palatable term dissociative amnesia. 
This term became the preferred and more widely used 
appellation for the process whereby traumas are ren-
dered inaccessible. For example, dissociative amnesia 
is mentioned in DSM–5 (American Psychiatric Associa-
tion, 2013), whereas repressed memory or repression is 
not.
There might be several reasons for why dissociative 
amnesia is listed in the DSM–5. One likely reason is 
that the substantial majority of the Task Force members 
of the DSM–5 were psychiatrists rather than psycholo-
gists, and the Task Force did not include memory 
experts (see Yan, 2007). This Task Force also did not 
adequately reflect the full range of scientific opinions 
regarding the empirical status of dissociative disorders, 
including dissociative amnesia. Indeed, as Lilienfeld, 
Watts, and Smith (2012) noted the following:
It is troubling that the DSM–5 Anxiety, Obsessive-
Compulsive Spectrum, Posttraumatic, and Dissociative 
Disorders Work Group contains no members who 
have expressed doubts in scholarly outlets regarding 
the etiology of dissociative identity disorder and 
related dissociative disorders (e.g., dissociative 
amnesia, dissociative fugue), despite the fact that 
these disorders are exceedingly controversial in the 
scientific community. (p. 831)
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Case studies of patients claiming dissociative amne-
sia have also figured prominently in the clinical litera-
ture, in turn perhaps contributing to the prima facie 
validity of the construct of dissociative amnesia (e.g., 
Staniloiu, Markowitsch, & Kordon, 2018).
We propose that during and after the 1990s, when 
the term repressed memory was widely criticized, pro-
ponents began to favor the term dissociative amnesia 
instead. Perhaps Holmes (1994) was one of the first to 
notice this trend:
In the absence of good laboratory or clinical 
evidence for repression, proponents of the 
concept have begun to emphasize dissociation 
instead. But that is simply another name for 
repression; if one dissociates oneself from an 
event (is no longer aware of it), one has repressed 
it. Dissociative amnesia is supposed to occur after 
certain traumatic experiences. Yet  alleged cases 
of this phenomenon are very rare. (p. 18)
Consistent with this idea, dissociative amnesia was not 
mentioned in pre-1990s work on repression by Holmes 
(1972, 1974) and Holmes and Schallow (1969). This 
subtle but significant name change has muddied the 
waters and provided a cover for the continued practice 
of psychotherapy that involves repressed memories, 
albeit under new terminology.
Dissociative amnesia is defined in the DSM–5 as the 
“inability to recall autobiographical information” that 
(a) is “usually of a traumatic or stressful nature,” (b) is 
“inconsistent with ordinary forgetting,” (c) should be 
“successfully stored,” (d) involves a period of time 
when there is an “inability to recall,” (e) is not caused 
by “a substance” or “neurological . . . condition,” and 
(f) is “always potentially reversible because the memory 
has been successfully stored” (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013, p. 298). These defining features serve 
as an umbrella set of criteria for three types of dissocia-
tive amnesia listed in the DSM–5. Localized dissociative 
amnesia applies to memory loss for a “circumscribed 
period of time” and may be broader than amnesia for 
a single traumatic event, for example, “months or years 
associated with child abuse” (p. 298). Because localized 
dissociative amnesia most resembles what was formerly 
called repressed memory, it is noteworthy that the 
DSM–5 calls this type “the most common form of dis-
sociative amnesia.” In selective dissociative amnesia, the 
individual “can recall some, but not all, of the events 
during a circumscribed period of time” (p. 298). Gen-
eralized dissociative amnesia involves “a complete loss 
of memory for one’s life history” and “is rare” (p. 298). 
The DSM–5 indicates “histories of trauma, child abuse, 
and victimization” as features that support a diagnosis 
of dissociative amnesia (p. 299).
Although dissociative symptoms can manifest them-
selves in contexts quite different from trauma—for exam-
ple, after the ingestion or administration of the anesthetic 
ketamine (Simeon, 2004) or ecstasy, cannabis, and 
cocaine (van Heugten-van der Kloet et al., 2015)—Table 
2 illustrates similarities in the definitions of dissociative 
amnesia from the DSM–5 and definitions advanced by 
scientific skeptics of repressed memory (text from Loftus, 
1993; and Holmes, 1974). We contend, on the basis of 
striking parallels in definitions, that skeptical arguments 
against repressed memories should apply with equal 
force to dissociative amnesia. More specifically, defini-
tions of both dissociative amnesia and repressed memory 
share the idea that traumatic or upsetting material is 
stored, becomes inaccessible because of the trauma, and 
can later be retrieved in intact form.
Although repressed memory as a concept is rarely 
defended in scientific circles these days, the idea of 
dissociative amnesia has become popular, especially in 
some psychiatric quarters. For example, between 2010 
and 2019, the Journal of Trauma & Dissociation has 
published 71 articles related to dissociative amnesia; 
between 1990 and 1999, no such articles were pub-
lished.2 This ascension appears to be a major reason 
for the revitalization of the memory wars and for the 
continuation of therapies that attempt to exhume trau-
matic memories. In the first two editions of the DSM 
(American Psychiatric Association, 1952, 1968), neither 
dissociative amnesia nor psychogenic amnesia was 
listed or mentioned, although dissociative types of neu-
rosis were. Psychogenic amnesia first appeared in the 
third edition of the DSM (American Psychiatric Associa-
tion, 1980; mentioned 19 times). Dissociative amnesia 
appeared for the first time in the fourth edition of the 
DSM (American Psychiatric Association, 1994; mentioned 
50 times). In DSM–5, dissociative amnesia appeared 75 
times (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Interest-
ingly, in no edition of the DSM have the words repress, 
repressed memory, or repression been used.
The DSM has codified and widely disseminated the 
concept of dissociative amnesia. In some quarters of 
psychology and psychiatry, dissociative amnesia is 
apparently taken as a valid and totally unproblematic 
concept (with notable exceptions; see Pope, Poliakoff, 
Parker, Boynes, & Hudson, 2007). Nevertheless, the 
definition of dissociative amnesia is scientifically fraught 
in many respects, just as is repressed memory. There 
are inherent problems when trying to ascertain whether 
a trauma has been stored but is nevertheless inacces-
sible. First, there is the complex problem of the lack of 
falsifiability: The only way we can determine whether 
a memory was stored is by memorial report, but a 
memorial report instantly disproves the claim that the 
memory is inaccessible. Second, it is difficult to test, or 
falsify, whether psychological trauma is the reason why 
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an event is not remembered. How this is established 
depends in part on the theoretical orientation of the 
psychologist and whether she or he interprets an inabil-
ity to recall as having been caused by psychogenic 
trauma or mundane encoding failures or forgetting 
mechanisms.
Indeed, one key question is whether cases that seem 
to document dissociative amnesia or repressed memory 
can be explained in terms of ordinary memory mecha-
nisms. An example is provided by McNally (2003), who 
commented on two alleged cases of dissociative/
psychogenic amnesia in children who had witnessed a 
lightning strike. McNally concluded that the memory 
loss could plausibly be explained by the fact that
both amnestic youngsters had themselves been 
struck by side flashes from the main lightning bolt, 
knocked unconscious, and nearly killed. Given the 
serious effects on the brain of being knocked 
unconscious by lightning, it is little wonder that these 
two children had no memory of the event. (p. 192)
The presence of a history of (mild) brain injury in 
case descriptions of patients diagnosed with dissocia-
tive amnesia has also been noted by other authors 
(Staniloiu & Markowitsch, 2014).
Consider another example that is illustrative of many 
similar clinical reports. Harrison et al. (2017) claimed 
to have documented 53 cases of, as the authors pre-
ferred to call it, “psychogenic amnesia.” These cases are 
cited by others as evidence for the existence of disso-
ciative amnesia (Brand et  al., 2018). Harrison et  al. 
(2017) asked the amnesics several questions concerning 
their autobiographical memory. Note that none of these 
cases adequately satisfied the six tenets of dissociative 
amnesia discussed earlier. For instance, amnesia due to 
neurological damage, such as “traumatic brain injury” 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013, p. 298), sub-
stance use, or other physical causes were not ruled out, 
which would preclude memory loss from being diag-
nosed in the DSM–5 as dissociative amnesia. The pos-
sibility of head injury causing memory impairment is 
particularly relevant here, especially because Harrison 
et al. found that a history of head injury was common 
in the “psychogenic” cases. In addition, Harrison et al. 
did not establish whether psychological shock or 
trauma caused the reported memory problems or that 
any recalled memories really were inaccessible for a 
period of time (see also Patihis, Otgaar, & Merckelbach, 
2019).
Another issue is that Harrison et al. (2017) did not 
exclude the possibility that the dissociative amnesia 
Table 2. Side-by-Side Comparisons of the Definitions of Dissociative Amnesia and Repressed Memory
Dissociative amnesia Repressed memory Repression
DSM–5 (APA, 2013, p. 298) Loftus (1993, p. 518) Holmes (1974, p. 632–633)
“inability to recall autobiographical 
information”
[implied indirectly in quotes] “repression is a loss [of memory] which 
. . .”
“usually of a traumatic or stressful nature, 
that is inconsistent with ordinary 
forgetting”
“something happens that is so 
shocking. . .”
“is specifically designed to selectively 
eliminate from consciousness those 
memories which cause the individual 
[affective] pain . . . rather than being a 
general loss due to simple decay”
“and that it should be successfully 
stored”
“that the mind grabs hold of the 
memory and pushes it underground”
“material which is repressed is not lost 
but rather stored in the unconscious 
[emphasis in original]”
“involves a period of time when there is 
an inability to recall”
“into some inaccessible corner of the 
unconscious. There it sleeps for years, 
or even decades, or even forever 
isolated from the rest of mental life”
[implied indirectly in quotes]
“not caused by ‘a substance’ or 
‘neurological . . . condition’ ”
[implied indirectly]
Implied cause: an event “that is so 
shocking”
[implied indirectly]
Implied cause: “repression is a process 
motivated by a need to avoid the 
disturbing affect associated with 
certain memories”
“always potentially reversible because the 
memory has been successfully stored”
“Then, one day, it may rise up and 
emerge into consciousness”
“the material can return to consciousness 
without having to go through the 
process of being relearned”
Note: DSM–5 = fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders; APA = American Psychiatric Association.
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was the result of feigning. This omission is remarkable 
because many of the patients with dissociative amnesia 
described by these authors were plagued by financial 
problems, and it would have been relatively easy to 
administer symptom-validity tests to them. With these 
tests, one can gauge whether patients endorse atypical 
or bizarre symptoms in an attempt to exaggerate their 
problems (Lilienfeld, Thames, & Watts, 2013; Peters, van 
Oorsouw, Jelicic, & Merckelbach, 2013). Other authors 
have found that overreporting of bizarre and implau-
sible symptoms (e.g., “When I hear voices I feel as 
though my teeth are leaving my body”) is prevalent 
among those who claim dissociative amnesia (Cima, 
Merckelbach, Hollnack, & Knauer, 2003). Claiming dis-
sociative amnesia is not the same as suffering from it 
(see also Peters et al., 2013). With this consideration in 
mind, Staniloiu and Markowitsch (2014) acknowledged 
in their review article that “the main challenge posed 
by the differential diagnosis of dissociative amnesia is 
to distinguish between true and feigned or malingered 
amnesia” (p. 237).
Key to our argument is that the evidence that scholars 
put forward for dissociative amnesia is typically subject 
to more plausible explanations. McNally (2007) listed 
several alternative and perhaps more plausible interpre-
tations of the evidence for dissociative amnesia. First, 
memory problems that emerge after trauma might be 
caused by everyday forgetfulness and should not be 
confused with amnesia for the trauma. Second, some 
dissociative-amnesia theorists have confused organic 
amnesia with dissociative amnesia. Third, people who 
have experienced trauma and cannot recollect all of it 
might have failed to encode relevant parts of the trau-
matic experience. Fourth, victims of abuse commonly 
fail to disclose the abuse (e.g., because they feel 
ashamed), a reporting decision that should not be con-
fused with dissociative amnesia. Fifth, when people can-
not recollect any events (even traumatic ones) before 
the age of about 3 years old, it likely reflects the well-
established phenomenon of childhood amnesia (Fivush, 
Haden, & Adam, 1995; Howe, 2013) rather than dissocia-
tion. Sixth and finally, victims of abuse understandably 
often do not want to think about their traumatic experi-
ences but often cannot help it because of flashbacks 
and intrusive memories. This phenomenon of suppres-
sion should not be confused with repression, and it falls 
well outside the domain of dissociative amnesia.
The Purported Empirical Evidence for 
Repressed-Memory Mechanisms
Three main areas of research are typically used to sup-
port repressed memories or dissociative amnesia: 
retrieval inhibition, motivated forgetting, and the 
relation between trauma and dissociation. Nevertheless, 
none of them fully supports all six parts of the defini-
tion of either concept shown in Table 2.
For example, the phenomenon of retrieval inhibition 
(M. C. Anderson & Green, 2001; Anderson & Hanslmayr, 
2014; M. C. Anderson et al., 2004) suggests that some 
mechanism inhibits some memories whereas others 
come to consciousness, and that trying not to think 
about a memory can make it harder to remember. How-
ever, this phenomenon does not meet the six tenets of 
dissociative amnesia, such as the principle that the 
event is often traumatic in nature (see also Kihlstrom, 
2002). Likewise, some research has shown limbic inhi-
bition via the frontal cortex among individuals with a 
subtype of PTSD that involves emotional suppression 
(Lanius et  al., 2010). Although interesting, cases of 
PTSD involving inhibited emotions do not establish that 
a memory is stored, that it is inaccessible because of 
trauma and then later becomes accessible. One can 
inhibit one’s emotions regarding a painful memory 
while retaining a full recollection of this memory.
Other research has shown that alleged cases of dis-
sociative amnesia were accompanied by increased pre-
frontal cortex activity and decreased activation of the 
hippocampus when patients were exposed to stimuli 
(i.e., certain faces) for which they had reported amnesia 
(Kikuchi et al., 2009). However, it would be premature 
to interpret this study as evidence for repressed/
dissociated memories. Before concluding that dissocia-
tive amnesia is involved, it is imperative to rule out 
other possible plausible explanations, such as feigned 
amnesia, which was not investigated in this work. This 
is all the more remarkable because one of the patients 
who claimed to be amnesic was worried about his 
impending marriage, whereas the other patient took a 
leave of absence from work after he had been involved 
in an accident.
Retrieval inhibition has been suggested to be “a via-
ble model for repression” (M. C. Anderson & Green, 
2001, p. 366). The canonical paradigm used to evaluate 
retrieval inhibition is the think/no-think paradigm 
(M. C. Anderson & Green, 2001). In the original version, 
participants see several unrelated word pairs (e.g., 
ordeal-roach). After seeing these stimuli, participants 
are presented with cue words (e.g., ordeal) and are 
instructed to either recall the associated word (think) 
or not (no-think). When participants are asked to recall 
all response words during the presentation of cue 
words, no-think response words are remembered less 
accurately. A meta-analysis showed that no-think words 
were associated with lower recall rates than items that 
were studied but not asked about during the think/no-
think phase (8% reduction; M. C. Anderson & Huddleston, 
2012). One problem with this meta-analysis is that no 
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unpublished studies from other labs were included, 
raising the specter of file-drawer effects and therefore 
inflated effect sizes. In fact, Bulevich, Roediger, Balota, 
and Butler (2006) conducted three experiments that 
failed to replicate the think/no-think memory-suppression 
effect and noted that “while working on this project, we 
have become aware of other groups of researchers who 
have failed to replicate the original M. C. Anderson and 
Green (2001) results, although most have given up and 
not attempted to publish their results” (p. 1574). Other 
memory researchers have recently pointed to unpub-
lished studies that failed to replicate the original think/
no-think finding (A. J. Barnier, personal communica-
tion, November 17, 2018; I. Wessel, personal commu-
nication, January 10, 2019).
Our argument is that the following two research lines 
are needed in the area of the think/no-think memory-
suppression effect. First, empirical work is necessary 
on the relation between trauma and memory suppres-
sion. To date, there is only limited work in this specific 
domain. For example, Hulbert and Anderson (2018) 
found that students reporting a greater history of trauma 
showed more memory suppression than did students 
who reported having little experience with trauma. 
Although interesting, this research does not causally 
establish whether trauma led to more memory suppres-
sion. Second, a multicenter replication attempt would 
yield critical information regarding the robustness, reli-
ability, and potential boundary conditions of the think/
no-think memory-suppression effect.
Motivated forgetting of trauma-related words in the 
directed-forgetting paradigm is another technique held 
up to support dissociative amnesia (as argued by 
DePrince et al., 2012 as part of betrayal trauma theory). 
For example, DePrince and Freyd (2001) argued they 
had adduced evidence for motivated forgetting in dis-
sociated individuals. In this study, participants scoring 
low and high on the dissociative-experiences scale 
(DES; E. M. Bernstein & Putnam, 1986) received several 
words (trauma-related and neutral) and after each word 
were instructed to remember or forget the word. The 
authors found that under divided-attention conditions, 
participants scoring high on dissociation recalled fewer 
trauma-related and more neutral words than those scor-
ing low on dissociation. Still, several other researchers 
could not replicate these results (e.g., Devilly et  al., 
2007; Giesbrecht & Merckelbach, 2009; McNally, 
Metzger, Lasko, Clancy, & Pitman, 1998). In recent 
research, Patihis and Place (2018) found only weak 
evidence supporting the hypothesis that traumatized 
and dissociated individuals would forget trauma-related 
words; only one of eight hypotheses predicted support 
for differential motivated forgetting. Patihis and Place 
(2018) pointed out the high number of “degrees of 
freedom” available to researchers to choose compari-
sons in such directed-forgetting experiments. As they 
noted:
Within a given data set, researchers can attempt to 
demonstrate differential forgetting between the To 
Be Remembered lists and the To Be Forgotten lists. 
If that fails they can compare trauma to positive 
or neutral words. If that fails they can look for 
statistical significance in several interactions—and 
they can make all these comparisons with a 
number of categorisations: on dissociation, trauma, 
diagnosis, acute stress, which all provide additional 
degrees of freedom. Given the number of possible 
combinations, a motivated researcher will likely 
be able to find one comparison that might be 
interpreted as motivated forgetting. (p. 630)
Even if this paradigm could consistently reveal that 
trauma words are remembered less well by dissociated 
individuals, it would not be evidence that a trauma can 
be stored and become both inaccessible and ultimately 
retrievable with accuracy. Furthermore, there is work 
showing that even directed forgetting of autobiographi-
cal memories is not significantly related to the emo-
tional valence of these memories, a finding that runs 
counter to the expectation that trauma should lead to 
a distinctive repression effect on memory (Barnier 
et al., 2007). Despite many assertions in the literature 
to the contrary, directed-forgetting research provides 
no compelling evidence for repressed memories or dis-
sociative amnesia. On a more general note, researchers 
have noted that the memory-impairing effects of 
directed forgetting may be due to a lack of rehearsal, 
thereby negating the need to invoke repressed memo-
ries (Roediger & Crowder, 1972).
In addition, researchers have heralded the statistical 
correlation between trauma and dissociative symptoms 
as support for a general theory that trauma can lead to 
dissociative amnesia (see Dalenberg et al., 2012, 2014; 
but see Lynn et al., 2014). However, even if this relation 
is strong—typically it is not (see Patihis & Lynn, 2017)—
this does not establish evidence for dissociative amne-
sia. Dissociation, as measured by the widely used DES, 
assesses feelings of depersonalization, derealization, 
and memory problems. These symptoms are not 
unlikely correlates of being traumatized or stressed for 
a period of time. Nevertheless, the DES does not assess 
dissociative amnesia as it is defined in the DSM–5, 
despite the use of the word “dissociative.” Specifically, 
the dissociative-amnesia subscale of the DES (e.g., 
Stockdale, Gridley, Balogh, & Holtgraves, 2002) con-
tains items such as “finding oneself in a place, but 
unaware how one got there,” “finding oneself dressed 
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up in clothes one can’t remember putting on,” “finding 
unfamiliar things among one’s belongings,” “not recog-
nizing friends or family members,” and “no memory of 
some important personal events (e.g., graduation)” 
(E. M. Bernstein & Putnam, 1986; pp. 733–734). These 
items do not describe dissociative amnesia and do not 
assess reactions to trauma and stored yet inaccessible 
memories. Rather, they might reflect poor attentive con-
trol and commonplace cognitive failures. Indeed, studies 
have found that in undergraduate samples, scores on the 
amnesia items of the DES correlate positively and sig-
nificantly with a measure of poor attentive control—that 
is, cognitive failures (Merckelbach, Muris, & Rassin, 1999: 
Study 1, r = .49; Study 2, r = .36; see also Merckelbach 
et al., 2000); for replication in nonclinical groups, see 
Bruce, Ray, and Carlson (2007: r = .31–.46).
The picture we have so far does not imply that dis-
sociation is unrelated to memory. Our position is that 
trauma can sometimes lead to feelings of depersonaliza-
tion and that, probably because of accompanying stress 
levels, memory problems might arise. However, this 
position does not favor the existence of dissociative 
amnesia, which implies that memories of entire auto-
biographical experiences have been temporarily inac-
cessible and can later be completely and accurately 
recovered (see also Patihis et al., 2019). It is true that 
some earlier studies (e.g., Eich, Macaulay, Loewenstein, 
& Dihle, 1997) found suggestive evidence for interiden-
tity amnesia in patients with dissociative identity disor-
der (DID). However, a more recent series of studies 
by Huntjens and colleagues demonstrated the impor-
tance of distinguishing between what people subjec-
tively report about their memory loss and (the absence 
of) objective manifestations of such loss. Huntjens, 
Verschuere, and McNally (2012) assessed the transfer 
of information between personality states in patients 
with a diagnosis of DID. Both tests of explicit and 
implicit memory were included, as well as neutral, emo-
tional, and autobiographical information. The data 
across studies were consistent in that, subjectively, DID 
patients reported amnesia between their personality 
states, but objectively, no evidence emerged for interi-
dentity amnesia (e.g., Dorahy & Huntjens, 2007; Huntjens 
et al., 2012).
Psychotherapeutic Techniques, Memory 
Distortions, and Other Side Effects
We now consider the role of therapy in the emergence 
of repressed memories. We discuss research on how 
often therapists suggest to clients that they might have 
repressed memories, the effects of therapy on (false) 
memory, and the link between psychopathology and 
(false) memory recovery.
Reports of recovered memories  
in therapy
We have shown that a large percentage of clinical psy-
chologists continue to believe that repressed memories 
might occur when people are faced with trauma. A 
pivotal point here is to know whether such beliefs bear 
any ramifications in therapeutic contexts. Patihis and 
Pendergrast (2019) surveyed 2,326 U.S. citizens about 
memory recovery in psychotherapy. Nine percent (n = 
217) of the sample reported that their therapists had 
discussed the possibility that they (the client) had 
repressed memories of childhood abuse. Furthermore, 
those participants were 20 times more likely to report 
recovering memories of abuse in therapy (that they 
were unaware of before therapy) than participants 
whose therapists did not discuss the possibility of 
repressed memories. Five percent (n = 122) of the pub-
lic sample reported that in the course of therapy, they 
had memories of being abused, of which they had no 
previous memory. Therapists who reported recovering 
memories engaged in a wide range of therapies, from 
attachment therapy to cognitive-behavioral therapy. In 
most therapy types, participants indicated a minority 
of therapists had discussed the possibility of repressed 
memories. For some therapies that involve working 
through past trauma, this occurred more frequently 
(e.g., attachment therapy, EMDR).
The study by Patihis and Pendergrast (2019) con-
cerned recovered memories in the United States; how-
ever, Shaw, Leonte, Ball, and Felstead (2017) examined 
the frequency of repressed and recovered memories in 
the United Kingdom. They analyzed cases from the 
British False Memory Society, which is a charity that 
supports individuals claiming to have been falsely 
accused of a crime on the basis of a false memory. The 
society database contains more than 2,500 cases since 
1993. The researchers selected a random sample from 
the database and found that 84.3% (n = 153) of daugh-
ters accusing fathers were said to have undergone a 
form of therapy ranging from standard psychotherapy 
to hypnosis. Furthermore, Shaw and Vredeveldt (2019) 
noted that the Dutch equivalent of the British False 
Memory Society, the Fictitious Memory Group, received 
13 new possible false-memory cases from 2011 and 
2018. Importantly, in 77% (n = 10) of these cases, 
alleged victims underwent some form of therapeutic 
intervention (e.g., EMDR, reincarnation therapy).
In Germany, a similar false-memory group called 
False Memory Deutschland (2019) maintains an archive 
containing cases of individuals claiming to have been 
falsely accused on the basis of recovered memories of 
sexual abuse. This group states on its website that at 
the time of the accusations, 83% (n = 81) of alleged 
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victims had been receiving psychotherapy. Even more 
interesting, the number of accusations has increased 
since 2002. All in all, reports of repressed memories in 
therapy occur on a nontrivial scale and can be found 
in many different countries. Of course, here too, the 
data should be interpreted with caution because selec-
tion biases might play a role. Still, the data provide 
additional evidence that the issue of repressed memo-
ries has not disappeared, and there are even some 
indications that that it has made a resurgence, at least 
in some areas (see also below).
Therapy and side effects
One of the most important hypotheses underlying the 
memory wars was that during psychological treatment, 
some therapists suggested to clients that they had 
repressed a memory of trauma, which might have 
engendered false memories. Although experimental 
work has confirmed that suggestive questions can elicit 
false memories (Scoboria et  al., 2017), a paucity of 
systematic research exists on how therapy shapes mem-
ory. Goodman, Goldfarb, Quas, and Lyon (2017) inves-
tigated whether therapy during a child sexual-abuse 
prosecution predicted memory consistency (10–16 
years later). Interestingly, the authors found that ther-
apy use positively correlated with memory consistency. 
Specifically, alleged victims who received therapy dur-
ing or shortly after the prosecution were more likely to 
correctly remember abuse-related details (e.g., name of 
the perpetrator, perpetrators’ age) than those who did 
not. The use of nonsuggestive psychotherapy may aid 
memory consistency rather than hinder it. However, 
consistent remembering is not the same as accurate 
remembering (Smeets, Candel, & Merckelbach, 2004; 
Talarico & Rubin, 2003).
Nevertheless, Goodman et al. (2017) did not specifi-
cally assess whether the type of therapy used was 
related to memory accuracy, and no causal conclusions 
concerning the effect of therapy on memory accuracy 
could be drawn from their study. Establishing a causal 
relation is important because some therapies, such as 
EMDR and psychoanalytic therapies, rely on patients 
retrieving specific autobiographical memories, and 
hence there might an increased risk of false memories. 
Furthermore, an important issue is whether certain 
therapies might increase people’s proneness to acqui-
esce with suggestions and form false memories. Indeed, 
Goodman et al. (2017) argued that “a study using an 
experimental design with random assignment to groups 
to investigate the effects of therapeutic intervention on 
true and false memory for traumatic events would be 
a welcome contribution to this important field of study” 
(p. 929). Houben, Otgaar, Roelofs, and Merckelbach 
(2018) addressed this issue by examining the effect of 
eye movements as provided in EMDR on false-memory 
formation (i.e., reporting of misinformation). Participants 
who received eye-movement treatments were more sus-
ceptible to creating false memories than participants who 
did not receive eye-movement treatments. Presumably, 
eye movements degraded memory, which might make 
people more susceptible to accept external misleading 
information—which could result in false memories (but 
see also van Schie & Leer, 2019). So, although eye move-
ments as in EMDR may improve memory retrieval (e.g., 
Lyle, 2018), they might also increase people’s willingness 
to accept external suggestions.
In addition to focusing on the effects of therapy on 
memory performance, it is imperative to examine 
unwanted side effects of psychotherapy as reported by 
the therapists and patients themselves. Although this work 
is limited, research has shown that psychotherapy can in 
some cases engender negative side effects (Lilienfeld, 
2007; Merckelbach, Houben, Dandachi-Fitzgerald, Otgaar, 
& Roelofs, 2018; Rozental et al., 2018). Of special inter-
est are studies that examined the relation between 
therapy and memory. For example, Rozental, Kottorp, 
Boettcher, Andersson, and Carlbring (2016) surveyed 
participants who had been in treatment for social anxi-
ety and found that the most frequently endorsed side 
effect of treatment was “unpleasant memories resur-
faced” (n = 251; 38%).
Especially relevant are studies examining what hap-
pened after clients recovered memories via therapy. 
Fetkewicz, Sharma, and Merskey (2000) noted that sui-
cide attempts increased after patients received recov-
ered-memory therapy, although the absence of a 
comparison group of patients who did not receive such 
interventions mitigates their conclusions. Loftus (1997) 
observed a similar pattern with patients who received 
compensation after recovering memories in therapy. 
Before memory recovery, 3 patients (10%) reported 
thinking about committing suicide, whereas after recov-
ery 20 patients (67%) reported being suicidal. Of course, 
it cannot be concluded that this specific therapy caused 
these suicide attempts or feelings, but it is concerning 
that patients can become more symptomatic after such 
therapeutic interventions. Collectively, research on the 
negative side effects of therapy, although limited in 
quantity, suggests that negative effects of therapy may 
not be negligible and that memory recovery may play 
a role in deterioration.
Psychopathology and false memory
Another way to examine the role of therapy in the 
reported unearthing of repressed memories is to deter-
mine whether people with some form of psychopathology 
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are at higher risk for false memories than are people 
without psychopathology. This information is vital because 
people might seek an explanation for their disorder in 
therapy (cf. “effort after meaning,” Bartlett, 1932), and 
therapists might actively search for such explanations in 
patients’ memories and thereby create a springboard for 
false memories. Authors have voiced differing opinions 
with regard to the relation between psychopathology and 
false-memory generation. For example, Bookbinder and 
Brainerd (2016) stated that “with respect to PTSD espe-
cially, available data do not provide a consistent picture 
of false memory effects” (p. 1345). In contrast, Scoboria 
et al. (2017) opined that “people struggling with psycho-
pathology who seek help for their symptoms may be 
particularly vulnerable to suggestions” (p. 160).
Otgaar, Muris, Howe, and Merckelbach (2017) 
recently reviewed the body of empirical work related 
to psychopathology and false-memory creation. Specifi-
cally, they focused on false-memory effects in people 
with PTSD, depression, and a history of trauma and 
found that in most of these studies, researchers used 
the Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) false-memory 
paradigm (Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995). 
In this paradigm, participants receive word lists contain-
ing associatively related words (e.g., night, pillow, 
moon). During recall and recognition tasks, participants 
frequently misremember a related but not presented 
word called the critical lure (in this case, sleep). Otgaar, 
Muris, et  al. (2017) also included experiments that 
relied on emotionally charged word lists related to 
some aspects of the participants’ psychopathology. For 
example, for patients with depression, lists could be 
used that focused on the word sad. The general finding 
from the review was that people with PTSD, depression, 
or a history of trauma were at increased risk of forming 
false memories when they received word lists linked to 
their symptoms (see also Howe & Malone, 2011). There 
is good evidence that certain forms of psychopathology 
(e.g., schizophrenia) go hand in hand with a tendency 
to accept and give in to external pressure (Peters, Moritz, 
Tekin, Jelicic, & Merckelbach, 2012). More importantly, 
existing work also indicates that psychopathology (i.e., 
depression, PTSD) is linked to an enhanced propensity 
to produce spontaneous false memories.
The implications of this review should be drawn with 
care, however, because spontaneous false memories as 
induced by the DRM paradigm are typically weakly 
related or even unrelated to false memories induced by 
suggestion (e.g., D. M. Bernstein, Scoboria, Desjarlais, 
& Soucie, 2018; Calado, Otgaar, & Muris, 2019; Nichols 
& Loftus, 2019; Ost et al., 2013; Otgaar & Candel, 2011; 
Patihis, Frenda, & Loftus, 2018; Zhu, Chen, Loftus, Lin, 
& Dong, 2013). So, although psychopathology seems 
to be related to an increased vulnerability for 
spontaneous false-memory production, this does not 
necessarily imply that it is also linked to an increased 
susceptibility to suggestion-induced false memories.
The Creation of Implanted False 
Memories
Many battles of the memory wars revolved around the 
issue of therapists who informed patients that they had 
repressed memories of childhood. The fact that some 
therapists suggested to patients that they had been 
sexually abused raised concerns regarding false memo-
ries in psychotherapy (Loftus, 1994) as well as whether 
suggestive therapeutic interventions could fuel false-
memory formation. Focusing on cases in which recov-
ered memories surfaced, researchers began to examine 
the conditions, such as the types of events suggested, 
under which false events could be inadvertently 
implanted in memory. Specifically, a question that was 
addressed was whether false events could be implanted 
and whether even emotionally negative false memories 
could be formed.
False events and implanted false 
memories
Researchers have used the false-memory-implantation 
paradigm to demonstrate that entire events, ranging 
from positive (e.g., a birthday party) to negative (e.g., 
getting lost in a shopping mall), can be implanted. In 
the false-memory-implantation paradigm (Loftus & 
Pickrell, 1995), participants are asked what they can 
remember about a true experienced event and a false 
event. Participants are (falsely) told that their parents 
confirmed that these events were experienced by the 
participants. During multiple suggestive interviews, 
about 30% of participants claim to remember the false 
event (Scoboria et al., 2017). Studies that have success-
fully implanted negative events bear special relevance 
to the claim that recovered memories of abuse may be 
instances of rich false memories.
For example, Hyman et  al. (1995) found in their 
implantation study that at the second suggestive inter-
view 10% (n = 2) of their subjects falsely remembered 
that they spent a night at the hospital because of a high 
fever and an ear infection. Loftus and Pickrell (1995) 
showed that 25% (n = 6) of their sample created false 
memories of being lost in a shopping mall. Porter, Yuille, 
and Lehman (1999) implanted several negative events 
(i.e., getting lost, serious medical procedure, getting seri-
ously hurt by a child, animal attack, indoor accident), 
and percentages of implantation ranged from 16.7% 
(n = 3; getting lost) to 36.8% (n = 7; animal attack). Shaw 
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and Porter (2015) found that 70% (n = 21) of participants 
formed false memories of committing a crime (but see 
Wade, Garry, & Pezdek, 2018, who used another scoring 
method and reported that only 26% to 30% of Shaw and 
Porter’s subjects formed false memories).
Of course, the events that have been implanted in 
experimental studies on false memories differ in various 
ways from recollected events in real cases (e.g., sexual 
abuse), which almost always involve feelings of shame 
and taboo (Goodman, Quas, & Ogle, 2010). Indeed, 
when Pezdek, Finger, and Hodge (1997) attempted to 
implant an experience of a rectal enema in adult partici-
pants, none of them fell prey to the suggestion. However, 
this is not to say that such events cannot be implanted 
in memory. Otgaar, Candel, Scoboria, and Merckelbach 
(2010) found that during the second interview, six chil-
dren (10%) falsely reported having received a rectal 
enema (see also Hart & Schooler, 2006). Furthermore, 
in general, research suggests that negative events are 
more likely to be misremembered than are more mun-
dane events (e.g., Otgaar, Candel, & Merckelbach, 2008; 
Porter, Taylor, & ten Brinke, 2008). This finding has been 
explained by the fact that because emotionally negative 
memories contain a high level of connectivity with other 
memories, it is relatively easy to activate and then 
remember events that were not experienced but related 
to the experienced event (e.g., Bookbinder & Brainerd, 
2016; Otgaar, Merckelbach, et al., 2017).
Although one could argue that the type of events 
implanted in false-memory research do not match 
events of interest in legal cases, in false-memory-
implantation studies, participants are generally inter-
viewed two or three times in a suggestive fashion, 
whereas legal cases often drive home the point that 
people with false memories received suggestive inter-
views by therapists over the course of years (Maran, 
2010; van Til, 1997). It seems safe to assume that with 
enough suggestive pressure, even extreme negative 
events may be implantable in memory.
Estimating the prevalence  
of false-memory implantation
Researchers have tried to estimate the percentage of 
individuals who develop false autobiographical memo-
ries in the laboratory. Such experiments have mainly 
involved healthy undergraduate students who are con-
fronted with suggestive information, after which their 
memory reports are evaluated for indications of accept-
ing false information. Attempting to come up with an 
accurate estimate is, however, a daunting task because 
studies differ in terms of coding and criteria for defining 
a report of false memory. Brewin and Andrews (2017) 
reviewed false-memory-implantation studies and con-
cluded that in 15% of the recollective experiences 
induced by the implantation method, statements were 
rated as full-blown false memories. They argued that 
this statistic shows that “susceptibility to false memories 
of childhood events appears more limited than has 
been suggested” (p. 2).
Nevertheless, the review by Brewin and Andrews 
(2017) has been criticized (for a critical analysis, see 
Otgaar, Merckelbach, et al., 2017). First, as mentioned 
previously, the coding of false memories varied among 
false-memory-implantation studies. Therefore, Scoboria 
et  al. (2017) devised a new coding system based on 
theories concerning remembering (e.g., Brewer, 1996; 
Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Johnson, Hashtroudi, 
& Lindsay, 1993; Rubin, 2006). Using this system, they 
recoded transcripts from eight published false-memory-
implantation studies. Overall, they found that 30.4% of 
transcripts were coded as false memories, which is 
twice the percentage that Brewin and Andrews (2017) 
reported. In addition, in the analysis by Scoboria et al., 
an additional 23% of cases were coded as having 
accepted the false event to some extent.
Second, Otgaar, Merckelbach, et al. (2017) reviewed 
15 false-memory laboratory studies that investigated 
the confidence that participants place in their false 
memories. The data revealed a mean confidence rating 
of 74%, with an unweighted 95% confidence interval = 
[0.66, 0.78].3 Furthermore, in 93% (k = 14) of the stud-
ies, false-memory reports had confidence ratings 
exceeding the midpoint of the rating scale. Clearly, 
confidence is often high in implanted false memories.
Third, even if we accept the highly conservative 15% 
as a fair estimate of overall false-memory potential, this 
percentage still points to a significant problem in legal 
and therapeutic settings. It means that if a therapist 
using suggestive prompts consulted with 100 patients, 
on average, 15 of them might develop illusory autobio-
graphical memories of, for example, sexual abuse, and 
some might falsely accuse an innocent person because 
of this memory (Nash, Wade, Garry, Loftus, & Ost, 2017; 
see also Smeets, Merckelbach, Jelicic, & Otgaar, 2017).
Memory Wars in the Courtroom  
and Beyond
We have reviewed several lines of evidence showing 
that the topic of repressed memories continues to be 
popular although scientifically controversial among 
psychologists and psychiatrists. We now examine the 
role of repressed memories and dissociative amnesia 
in legal cases and the persistence of naive memory 
beliefs in the courtroom.
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Repressed memories and dissociative 
amnesia in the courtroom
In 2017, a French ministerial report was published pro-
posing to increase the statute of limitations for prose-
cuting sexual abuse from 20 to 30 years (Flament & 
Calmettes, 2017). The reason given was that because 
victims often delay disclosing their abusive experience 
(e.g., Goodman-Brown, Edelstein, Goodman, Jones, & 
Gordon, 2003; see also Connolly & Read, 2006), they 
are still entitled to have their day in court. However, a 
more controversial reason for increasing the statute of 
limitations given in the report was that traumatic experi-
ences of abuse could lead to dissociative amnesia 
(Dodier & Thomas, 2019). Dodier and Thomas rightly 
noted that the use of such a controversial term in an 
official governmental report might lead people with a 
history of trauma to believe that their traumatic memo-
ries are atypical and that to uncover additional memo-
ries they should rely on methods such as recovered 
memory therapy that might result in false memories. 
Admittedly, victims might take many years to disclose 
their traumatic experiences, but as noted before, there 
are more plausible explanations than dissociative amne-
sia for the delay in reporting the abuse, such as feeling 
ashamed of the trauma and reinterpreting the experi-
ence as abusive (e.g., Goodman-Brown et  al., 2003; 
Schooler, 2001). This issue of delayed disclosure is espe-
cially relevant to stress, as there is currently much atten-
tion regarding historic sexual abuse cases, such as those 
that emerged in the #MeToo discussion, of which the 
overwhelming majority has nothing to do with memory 
repression or recovery (see also Goodman et al., 2017).
There is also evidence of recovered memories enter-
ing into some cases in the United Kingdom. The UK 
Advocate’s Gateway (2015) document on trauma 
explains to lawyers how to approach traumatized wit-
nesses and victims. It stipulates that dissociative amne-
sia is possible and argues that “Trauma disrupts the left 
hemisphere function of the brain. . . . This disruption 
affects the ability to give a verbal narrative. . . . The 
right hemisphere of the brain stores implicit or sensory 
associated memories” (p. 5). This is questionable advice, 
with some potentially unsupported and pseudoscien-
tific ideas mixed into the document.
An alternative way to examine whether the issue of 
repressed memories and dissociative amnesia is still 
prominent in the legal arena is to examine court pro-
ceedings and investigate the number of cases in which 
repressed memories played a role. In the Netherlands, 
an online database of court rulings (http://www.recht 
spraak.nl) exists in which one can search for key terms 
in a diverse set of cases. The database is not exhaustive 
in that it only lists the most prominent court rulings. 
We used the search term verdringing (“repression”) and 
investigated criminal trials from 1990 to 2018 in which 
repressed memories were mentioned. Figure 1 demon-
strates that cases in which this term was used referring 
to cases on repressed memories have increased over 
the past years. When a similar exercise was performed 
using the search term hervonden herinnering (“recov-
ered memory”), a similar pattern emerged. Moreover, 
when we used the term dissociatieve amnesia (“dis-
sociative amnesia”), again, we found that this term is 
on the rise.4
Caution should be exerted when interpreting these 
data. First, it is remarkable that virtually no legal cases 
were found on repression and recovered memory from 
1990 to 2000. One reason might be that such older cases 
are not represented in this database. Second, although 
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Fig. 1. Number of Dutch legal cases mentioning repression, recovered memory, or dissocia-
tive memory from 1990 to 2018.
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issues such as repressed and recovered memories were 
discussed in these criminal trials summarized by perti-
nent court rulings thereafter, judges did not necessarily 
accept these notions uncritically. Nonetheless, these 
data demonstrate that, at least in the Netherlands, legal 
professionals still use the Freudian and neo-Freudian 
nomenclature of repression and dissociative amnesia.
Memory beliefs in the courtroom
Although we have discussed naive beliefs about mem-
ory across a variety of lay and professional populations, 
these beliefs can be especially problematic in the court-
room. Because judicial outcomes may be influenced by 
the naive beliefs about memory that triers of fact har-
bor, it is critical that when testimony consists mainly of 
memory evidence (e.g., remembering event details, 
identifying the perpetrator), actors in the legal domain 
possess a scientifically informed view of how memory 
works.
To appreciate how the disconnect between the sci-
ence of memory and the beliefs held by individuals in 
the legal arena can lead to unsafe convictions, one can 
examine the cases listed on the Innocence Project web-
sites in the United States (http://www.innocenceproject 
.org) and the United Kingdom (http://www.innocen 
cenetwork.org.uk). The most common factor in these 
false convictions has been faulty memory evidence (i.e., 
incorrect eyewitness identifications are implicated in 
more than 70% of cases). Police and prosecutors appar-
ently made decisions about this memory evidence per-
haps without exactly understanding the science of how 
memory works and often because other more objective 
evidence was lacking (for reviews, see Howe & Knott, 
2015; Howe, Knott, & Conway, 2018).
Judges and prosecutors alike differ as to whether 
they will accept expert memory testimony. For example, 
in a Dutch revision case in which dissociative memories 
of abuse were the central issue, one senior prosecutor 
opined that in contrast to DNA experts, psychological 
experts do not aid judges in helping them to understand 
the intricacies of statements by witnesses or defendants 
(https://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=
ECLI:NL:PHR:2015:2769). He added that the field of 
legal psychology is known for its lack of consensus and 
for its high degree of subjectivity, which is hyperbolic 
when one looks at the generally broad consensus on 
a range of topics found in surveys among legal psy-
chologists (Kassin, Redlich, Alceste, & Luke, 2018; 
Kassin et al., 2001). Furthermore, research clearly indi-
cates that judges routinely overestimate jurors’ ability 
to understand and correctly use memory evidence 
when in fact it is based solely on their “common 
sense”—such as that memory works like a video camera 
(e.g., Houston, Hope, Memon, & Read, 2013; Magnussen 
et  al., 2010); for the Scooter Libby effect, see also 
Kassam, Gilbert, Swencionis, & Wilson, 2009).
The question of whether jurors’ commonsense views 
of memory in court are adequate also extends to cases 
in which adults are recollecting events that happened 
decades earlier in childhood. As elsewhere, it is not a 
given that judges will necessarily accept scientific 
expert testimony about memory in their courtroom to 
counteract the commonsense views held by jurors and 
others involved in the judicial system. Progress has 
been made in some U.S. states in which judges in trials 
involving eyewitness identification must now present 
jurors with cautions about the reliability of such evi-
dence before their deliberation (State of New Jersey v. 
Henderson, 2011). In Pennsylvania, Loftus, Francis, and 
Turgeon (2012) drafted jury instructions that addressed 
issues concerning a broad spectrum of expert memory 
testimony. Likewise, in the United Kingdom, judges are 
now obligated to give juries so-called Turnbull guide-
lines in the cases that heavily rely on eyewitness iden-
tification (Trevelyan, n.d.). Admittedly, these are but a 
few recent examples, and much more research needs 
to be conducted to counteract the impact of erroneous 
lay beliefs about memory in the courtroom.
Furthermore, it is also imperative that such guide-
lines are not fixed but are provisional and can be 
updated any time. Guidelines are ideally based on the 
current corpus of scientific findings, but new findings 
might warrant amendments. For example, previous 
research has suggested that the confidence that eyewit-
nesses place in their identification is only weakly 
related to their accuracy. In contrast, recent research 
has demonstrated that under optimal conditions, con-
fidence is strongly predictive of accuracy (Sauerland & 
Sporer, 2009; Wixted & Wells, 2017). It is important to 
be cognizant about such new developments.
Memory wars in the scientific literature
One might posit that although the controversial issue 
of repressed memories is still relevant in clinical and 
legal contexts, the debate concerning repressed memo-
ries is now muted in the scientific literature. There are 
two indications that this is not the case. First, in a recent 
bibliometric analysis, Dodier (2019) examined the num-
ber of publications and citations regarding repressed 
and recovered memories from 2001 to 2018. The author 
found that proponents and opponents of repressed 
memories have continued to publish articles about 
repressed and recovered memories throughout the time 
period. Notably, these articles were cited just as often 
as articles published during the presumed heyday of 
the memory wars in the 1990s. In addition, the year 
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2018 witnessed an increase in publications on this 
topic. This increase was characterized by a mix of arti-
cles in favor or against the concept of repressed memo-
ries. Specifically, of the 16 articles in 2018, 5 (31%) were 
largely or entirely in favor of the existence of repressed 
memories, whereas 9 (56%) articles expressed skepti-
cism regarding the existence of repressed memories 
(two articles adopted a neutral position).
Second, the debate over repressed memories and 
dissociative amnesia has hardly vanished from the sci-
entific literature. For example, Brand, Schielke, and 
Brams (2017) and Brand, Schielke, Brams, and DiComo 
(2017) recently tried to provide legal professionals with 
evidence-based knowledge on trauma-related dissocia-
tion and concomitant effects such as dissociative amne-
sia. Their articles provoked a disagreement between 
them and memory researchers who argued that their 
conclusions were not based on evidence and poten-
tially hazardous (Brand et  al., 2018; Merckelbach & 
Patihis, 2018; Patihis et al., 2019). Debates relating to 
the issue of dissociative amnesia, repressed memories, 
or both, are clearly alive and well in the scientific lit-
erature (see also Staniloiu & Markowitsch, 2014).
Conclusion
The claims of some authors to the contrary, the contro-
versial topic of repressed memories and dissociative 
amnesia continues to be very much alive in clinical, 
legal, and academic contexts. Converging lines of evi-
dence suggest that concerns regarding the widespread 
belief in repressed memories are far from having been 
resolved following the memory wars of the 1990s. 
Across many different professionals (e.g., psychothera-
pists), the percentage who believe in repressed memo-
ries remains high, generally above 50%. Furthermore, 
the idea of repressed memories has merely become 
popular under a different name—dissociative amnesia—
which shares many characteristics with repressed mem-
ory and that carries the added cachet of being associated 
with the DSM–5 (American Psychiatric Association, 
2013). In addition, research points to the possibility that 
some therapeutic techniques exert adverse effects by 
potentially increasing the likelihood of false memories. 
Finally, questions of repressed memories continue to 
be addressed in the courtroom and in the scientific 
literature. Taken together, these different threads of 
evidence imply that falsely recovered memories of 
abuse continue to pose a substantial risk in therapeutic 
settings, potentially leading to false accusations and 
associated miscarriages of justice.
A relevant question is how flawed ideas regarding 
the functioning of memory could be corrected. That 
unconscious repressed memory is still accepted with 
little qualification and remains popular among many 
mental-health professionals can be explained in part 
by the now well-replicated finding that it is typically 
difficult to correct erroneous beliefs. Specifically, when 
people are confronted with any form of misinformation 
(e.g., fake news), correcting such errors is challenging, 
a phenomenon referred to as the continued-influence 
effect (Lewandowsky, Ecker, Seifert, Schwarz, & Cook, 
2012; see also Lilienfeld, Marshall, Todd, & Shane, 2014) 
or belief perseverance (C. A. Anderson, Lepper, & Ross, 
1980). However, recent studies suggest that informing 
people that their firmly held beliefs are incorrect (“pre-
bunking”), and even providing them with the correct 
alternative information (debunking), can often be effec-
tive in correcting these beliefs (e.g., Blank & Launay, 
2014; Crozier & Strange, 2019). In addition to applying 
these provisional but promising methods, it is crucially 
important to educate individuals, especially legal pro-
fessionals and clinicians, about the science of memory. 
This effort is all the more essential given that these 
professionals are often in close contact with victims, 
patients, witnesses, and suspects. Such interactions are 
a prime opportunity for inadvertent memory contami-
nation. Increasing their awareness of potentially harm-
ful beliefs about repressed memories should therefore 
be a priority in clinical and legal work as well as for 
psychological scientists at large.
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Notes
1. We use the term false memory in this article to refer to the 
remembrance of events/details that did not occur (e.g., Loftus, 
2005).
2. On the website of the Journal of Trauma & Dissociation, we 
looked for articles using the search term “dissociative amnesia” 
from January 2010 to May 2019 and from January 1990 to May 
1999.
3. In the reviewed studies, confidence was measured using dif-
ferent rating scales (e.g., 1–5, 1–10, 50–100).
4. We explored whether the rise of these terms is also evident 
when controlling for the total number of cases in the Dutch 
legal database. From 2001 to 2010, there were a total of 192,345 
cases, and from 2011 to 2018 there were a total of 267,377 
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cases. Even if these base rates were taken into account, we 
found that the terms recovered memory (9 × 10−5 to 1.2 × 10−4) 
and dissociative amnesia (7 × 10−5 to 1 × 10−4) increased from 
2001 to 2010 to 2011 to 2018.
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